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Abstract: In this paper, we propose a fuzzy local search (FLS) method for intrusion detection. The FLS system is 
a fuzzy classifier, whose knowledge base is modeled as a fuzzy rule such as "if-then" and improved by a local 
search metaheuristic. The proposed method is implemented and tested on the benchmark KDD'99 intrusion 
dataset. The results are encouraging and demonstrate the benefits of our approach. 
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1. Introduction 
An intrusion detection system (IDS) is software 
or hardware or both of them designed to monitor 
computer system or network activities for malicious 
activities or policy violations.  Intrusion detection is an 
important topic in computer security. There are two 
main intrusion detection models: anomaly detection and 
misuse detection approaches.  
• The anomaly detection model describes the usual 
behaviour of a user to detect this user's anomalous or 
unaccustomed action. Among methods proposed to 
construct profiles, we mention:  the statistical 
methods where the profile is calculated from 
variables taken randomly and sampled at regular 
intervals [12]. These variables can be, for example, 
the number of connections, the number of erroneous 
passwords, etc.  The expert systems [21] and neural 
networks [7] are two well-known methods used to 
calculate a user profile.  
• The misuse detection model defines some anomalous 
behaviour to analyze data susceptible to be attacked. 
The approach often uses known attacks called 
signatures. Among these methods, we mention: the 
expert systems [16], the genetic algorithm [17] and 
the pattern matching method that provides signatures 
of attacks. Various algorithms are used to localize 
these signatures in the audit trail [14]. 
Recently, several systems have been built to 
detect intrusions [8]. Various techniques have been 
applied extensively for intrusion detection such as 
agents-based detection intrusion [6, 5] which can 
provide many advantages for the existing solutions due 
to the mobility of agents and their cooperative aspects, 
the Data mining approaches [15], the clustering  
 
 
techniques [19], the naïve Bayesian classifier [13, 4], 
and the fuzzy evolutionary algorithms [1, 20]. Fuzzy 
logic [22] is an intelligent method that has been 
successfully employed for many IDSs [10, 9, 2].  
In this work, we focus on local search 
metaheuristic for intrusion detections. The system 
which we propose is a fuzzy classifier, whose 
knowledge base is modelled as a fuzzy rule such as 
"if-then" that can be improved by a local search. The 
main objective is to design an intrusion detection 
system able to distinguish between normal an 
abnormal events. The system starts with an initial set 
of fuzzy rules generated randomly, and then a local 
search process is launched to optimize the fuzzy rules.  
The oriented intrusion detection dataset used 
in the experimental study of this work are those of 
KDD'99. More precisely, we handle 10% of the 
KDD'99 [23] dataset. As shown in Table 1, the 
KDD99 dataset contains 22 different attack types 
which could be classified into four main categories 
namely Denial of Service (DoS), Remote to User 
(R2L), User to Root (U2R) and Probing.   
Table1. Types of Attacks in KDD’99 Dataset. 
Main Attack Classes 22 Attacks Classes 
Denial of Service 
(DOS) 
back, land, _eptune, pod, smurt, teardrop 
User to Root (U2R)  
 
buffer_overflow, perl, loadmodule, 
rootkit 
Remote to User (R2L 
 
ftp_write, guess_passwd, imap, 
multihop, phf, spy, warezclient, 
warezmaster 
Probing ipsweep, nmap, portsweep, satan 
 
The paper is organized as follows. The second 
section presents the fuzzy local search method for 
intrusion detection. The implementation and some 
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numerical results are given in section three. Finally, the 
fourth section concludes the work. 
 
2. The Proposed Approach 
The proposed approach consists of two main 
steps detailed in the following.  
 
2.1. Data Pre-Processing and Normalization 
Each line of the KDD'99 dataset called 
"connection" includes a set of 41 features and a label 
which specifies the status of connection as either 
normal or specific attack type. 
 
The features of a connection include the 
duration of the connection, the type of the protocol 
(TCP, UDP, etc), the network service (http, telnet, etc), 
the number of failed login attempts, and the service and 
so on. These features had all forms of continuous, 
discrete, and symbolic, with significantly varying 
ranges.  Among the 41 attributes of the connection, we 
consider only sixteen significant1 attributes which are: 
A8, A9, A10, A11, A13, A16, A17, A18, A19, A23, A24, 
A32, A33, A1, A5 and A6.  These attributes are 
normalized. The normalization formula given in (1) is 
applied in order to set attribute numerical values in the 
range [0.0, 1.0].  
 
Where X: is the numerical attribute value, MIN is the minimum value that 
the attribute X can get and MAX is the maximum one. 
 
After having analyzed the KDD’99 dataset, the MIN 
and MAX values of each significant attributes which 
we have selected and considered in the current work are 
given as follows:  
• A8:  is the number of ``wrong'' fragments,  
values in the range [0.3]    (MIN = 0 MAX = 3), 
• A9: is the number of urgent packets                                                
values in the range [0,14],  
• A10: is the number of ``hot'' indicators,                                              
values in the range [0.101],  
• A11: is the number of failed login attempts,                              
values in the range [0.5], 
• A13: is the number of ``compromised'' 
conditions,                             values in the range  
[0.9],  
• A16 : is the number of ``root'' accesses,                                               
values in the range [0.7468], 
• A17: is the number of file creation operations, 
values in the range [0,100], 
• A18 is the number of shell prompts,                                                   
values in the range [0,5],  
                                                 
1 Significant attributes are the important ones that can help in 
classifying a connection correctly.   
• A19: is the number of operations on access 
control files,  values in the range [0.9], 
• A23: is the number of connections to the same 
host as the current connection in the past two 
seconds, values in the range  [0.511],  
• A24: is the number of connections to the same 
service as the current connection in the past two 
seconds, values in the range  [0.511], 
• A32: is the number of connection to the same 
host, values in the range  [0,255]  
• A33: is the number of connection to the same 
serves for the host, values in the range [0,255]. 
 
• A1: duration is number of seconds of the 
connection, values in the range [0. 58329].  
• A5: is the number of data bytes from source to 
destination, values in the range [0.1.3 one 
billion].  
• A6: is the number of data bytes from destination 
to source, values in the range [0.  1.3 one 
billion]. 
 
However, for the numerical attributes A1, A5 
and A6, we have observed a big value of MAX hence 
the need to modify the normalization formula given in 
(1). The logarithmic  scaling  (with  base  10) is  
applied  to  these  features  to  reduce  the  range.  
 
We used all the sixteen features as the inputs of our 
Local-fuzzy classifier which is detailed in the next 
section. 
 
2.2. Local Search Step 
The Fuzzy local search approach that we 
propose can be subdivided into two main stages. In the 
first stage, we generate randomly a set of “if-then” 
fuzzy rules. We used the concept of fuzzy logic in 
solving the problem of intrusion detection because 
fuzzy logic is an effective tool for introducing the 
concept of membership degree that determines the 
"strength" in which an object belongs to different 
classes.  
The goal of the second stage of the local 
search is to optimize the set of fuzzy rules already 
generated in the first stage.  For each connection to be 
analyzed, a local search is applied on. The FLS that 
we propose starts from a random initial solution (a "if-
then" fuzzy rule) and tries to improve it, seeking a 
better solution in the current neighbourhood. A 
neighbourhood solution Sol is an adjacent element to 
Sol achieved by a change on the current configuration. 
The local search process is repeated until a number of 
iterations fixed empirically.  
 
The components of the FLS for intrusion detection are 
defined as follows: 
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2.3. Fuzzy Rule Encoding 
A fuzzy rule "if-then" is encoded as a string. 
We have used a vector of 16 bits where each bit 
corresponds to an attribute. Five possible linguistic 
values may be used for each attribute which are: S: 
Small, MS: Medium Small, M: Medium, ML: Medium 
Large and L: Large.  Figure 1 draws the Membership 
functions of the five linguistic values. 
 
 
For example: 
• Let us consider the rule: If X1 is medium, X2 is 
medium small X3 is large and X4 is small, then 
Class= Cj with CF = CFj.  Where Xi is the connection 
attribute, Cj is the class obtained after classification 
and CFj is its degree of confidence.  
• The Corresponding code is :  ''M, MS, L, S'' 
 
Figure 1: Membership Functions of Five Linguistic Values (S: 
Small, MS: Medium Small, M: Medium, ML: Medium Large, L: 
Large). 
 
2.4. Membership Function µ (X) 
The membership function for each attribute X 
noted μ(X) is calculated by a projection on the graph of 
the fuzzy set depicted in Figure 2.  Formula (2) shows 
how we can calculate the μ(X) value.  
 
 
where: b is the base of the triangle, b = 0.5.  
X0 = {0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1} corresponding to  
         {S, MS, M, ML, L}. 
X: is the attribute value after normalization 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                  Figure 2: The Fuzzification Method 
 
2.5. Initial Solution Generation  
The initial solution representing a fuzzy “if-
then” rule is generated randomly. For each attribute Xi, 
a linguistic value (among the five values of the fuzzy 
set) is assigned randomly. 
2.6. Evaluation of a Fuzzy “if-then” Rule 
In this section we show how the fuzzy “if-
then” rule Rj is evaluated and how a classification is 
given for a connection Xp with a certain confidence 
degree. Here we use the method introduced in [11].   
 
To evaluate a fuzzy rule Rj, we give the following 
steps: 
 
1 - Calculate the compatibility of connections with 
the rule Rj 
 
Let us consider the fuzzy if-then rule Rj 
denoted “Aj1 AJ2 ... ....''AJn”, we calculate the 
compatibility of each connection Xp of the dataset 
with the rule Rj by using the Formula (3).  
 
 
 
where µ() is the membership function. m: is 
the total number of connections. Xi: are the attributes. 
Xp is the current connection and n is the number of 
attributes which equals to 16. 
 
2 - Calculate the sum of the compatibilities for each 
class of the five categories: for each class h belonging 
to the five classes DoS, R2L, U2R, Probing and 
Normal, we calculate the sum of compatibilities as 
given in Formula (4). 
 
 
After having calculated the sum of 
compatibilities of a rule Rj for each class h, we 
selected the class having the maximum value (as given 
in Formula (5)). This class Cj is considered the 
suitable class for the rule Rj.  If two classes had the 
same maximum value then the class is not specified 
(Cj = null) and CFj = 0. 
 
 
 
 
 
The confidence degree CFj of the class Cj for the rule 
Rj is computed by the Formula (6). 
 
 
 
The formula (7) shows how the fitness of a fuzzy rule 
is obtained.  
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The PPF represents the Positive Power Rule. The 
fitness value of a rule is the sum of the PPF for all 
considered classes.    
 
2.7. Generation of Neighbour Solutions 
The FLS starts with an initial solution Sol (Sol 
is a fuzzy if-then rule Rj) generated randomly. Then it 
performs a certain number of local steps consisting of a 
random modification of the value of an attribute. An 
attribute value can be one of the five linguistic values 
of fuzzy set. The neighbour solutions are evaluated 
according to the fitness value and the solution having 
high fitness value, denoted Sol’ will be considered for 
the next iteration of the local search process.  
 
2.8. Stopping Criterion  
The FLS process is repeated until a certain 
number of iterations called maxiter is reached. 
 
2.9. The FLS Algorithm  
The FLS method for intrusion detection is 
sketched in Algorithm 1. 
 
Algorithm 1: The FLS Method for Intrusion Detection. 
 
Require: Data file, maxiter 
Ensure: a set of fuzzy rules 
1: for each connection in the dataset do 
2:     Generate a random initial solution Sol; 
3:    Assign a class Cj to Sol with a CFj confidence degree 
4:    Evaluate the fitness of Sol 
5:     for I= 1 to maxiter do 
6:        Generate a neighbor solution sol’; 
7:        Assign a class to Sol’ with a confidence degree 
8:        Evaluate the fitness of Sol ' 
9:      if fitness (Sol) ≺fitness (Sol’) then 
10:           Sol ⇐Sol’ 
11:    end if 
12:    end for 
13: return the best solution found with the high fitness 
value. 
14: end for 
 
3. Experimental and Numerical Results  
The implementation was done on MATLAB. 
First, we have created five matrices: the matrix 
containing the U2R-events, the matrix containing R2L-
events, the matrix containing the Probing events, the 
matrix containing the DOS events and the matrix 
containing the normal connections. Then, the   
normalization phase is launched where the various 
attributes of connections of all matrices are 
normalized.   
 
We have obtained five normalized matrices 
U2R, R2L, Probing, Normal and DOS. The next step 
is the generation of fuzzy rules. To do this, we used 
the “rand” function (random number to generate 
random numbers that must be among the five values 
(1, 2, 3, 4. 5) which correspond to (Small, Medium 
Small, Medium, Medium Large and Large). 
 
We have applied the FLS on the five matrices 
Rand representing fuzzy rules. The number of 
iterations of the local search is set empirically to 200. 
 
3.1. Numerical Results  
All experiments were performed on a 
computer CPU Intel Core Duo 1.8GHz with 2GB of 
Ram. 
 
Tables 2 to 6 give some examples of the 
classification results obtained by the FLS on some 
connections taken from the five different classes. The 
first column represents the number of the random rule, 
the second column gives the classification found by 
the FLS to the rule, and the third column is the 
confidence degree of the rule. The firth column gives 
the fitness value of the rule.  
 
 
Table2.  Some Results Obtained by FLS for DOS Class. 
Rules Classification 
Degree of 
Confidence 
Fitness 
 
 R1 U2R 0.9469 8 
R2 R2L 1 1 
R3 PROBING 1 17 
R4 R2L 0.9807 18 
R5 NORMAL 0.9636 20 
R6 NORMAL 0.3245 10 
R7 DOS 1 5 
R8 DOS 1 18 
R9 DOS 1 18 
R10 DOS 1 18 
R11 DOS 1 11 
R12 DOS 1 11 
R13 DOS 1 5 
R14 DOS 0.7132 2 
R15 DOS 0.7132 2 
 
 
 
Table3.  Some Results Obtained by FLS for R2L Class. 
Rules Classification 
Degree of 
confidence Fitness 
R1 U2R 0.9469 8 
R2 NO SPECIFIE 0 0 
R3 PROBING 1 17 
R4 R2L 0.9807 18 
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R5 NORMAL 0.9979 20 
R6 PROBING 0.5291 11 
R7 DOS 1 5 
R8 R2L 0.5026 ۱۸ 
R9 U2R 0.7983 4 
R10 PROBING 1 17 
R11 PROBING 1 17 
R12 PROBING 1 17 
R13 PROBING 1 17 
R14 PROBING 1 17 
 
 
Table4.  Some Results Obtained by FLS for U2R Class. 
Rules Classification 
Degree of 
confidence Fitness 
R1 DOS 1 5 
R2 DOS ۰.۷۱۳۲ 2 
R2 U2R ۰.۸۸۸۰ 8 
R4 R2L ۰.۳۸۰۱ 18 
R5 U2R ۰.۷۹۸۳ 4 
R6 DOS 1 5 
R7 U2R ۰.۹۷٤٥ 5 
R8 NON SPECIFIE 0 0 
R9 DOS 1 1 
R10 DOS 1 4 
R11 DOS 1 11 
R12 DOS 1 11 
R13 NORMAL ۰.۹۰٥٦ 12 
R14 DOS 1 4 
R15 DOS 1 11 
 
Table5.  Some Results Obtained by FLS for Probing Class. 
Rules Classification 
Degree of 
confidence Fitness 
R1 NORMAL 1 8 
R2 DOS 1 11 
R3 PROBING 1 17 
R4 PROBING 0.9966 17 
R5 PROBING 1 17 
R6 PROBING 1 17 
R7 PROBING 1 17 
R8 NORMAL 0.3245 10 
R9 DOS 1 5 
R10 U2R 0.9469 8 
R11 NON SPECIFIE 0 0 
R12 PROBING 1 17 
R13 DOS 1 11 
R14 PROBING 1 17 
R15 DOS 1 5 
 
According to the results obtained by the FLS, 
we have observed that the FLS succeeds in finding 
good results for the four classes DoS, R2L, U2R and 
Probing, and false alarms are minimal. The success 
rates are as follows: 80% for DOS class, 85% for R2L 
class, 95% for U2R class, 80% for Probing class.  
However, for the normal class, it was noted that the 
method FLS fails and the success rate is 10%. 
Table6.  Some Results Obtained by FLS for Normal Class. 
Rules Classification 
Degree of 
confidence Fitness 
R1 U2R 0.9469 8 
R2 R2L 1 1 
R3 PROBING 1 17 
R4 PROBING 1 17 
R5 PROBING 1 17 
R6 PROBING 1 17 
R7 PROBING 1 17 
R8 R2L 0.3801 18 
R9 NORMAL 1 8 
R10 PROBING 1 17 
R11 PROBING 1 17 
R12 PROBING 1 17 
R13 NORMAL 1 8 
 
 
3.2. Comparative Study   
In order to situate our contribution, we 
compared our results with some well-know methods 
for intrusion detection such as: the Evolutionary Soft 
Computing Intrusion Detection System ESC-IDS [20], 
Hybrid EFS [2], C4.5 [18], 5-NN [3], EFRID 
(Evolving Fuzzy Rules for Intrusion. Detection) 
proposed in [10], NB [13] and Naive Bayesian 
classifier [4] Table 7 presents the results obtained for 
the five classes.  
 
Table 7: Comparison of Some Algorithms 
CLASS 
Algorithm Normal 
% 
U2R 
% 
R2L
% 
DOS 
% 
Probing
% 
FLS 10 95 85 80 80 
ESC-IDS 98.2 14.1 31.5 99.5 84.1 
Hybrid EFS 98.5 76.3 89 98.5 82.5 
C4.5 95.9 21.1 30.2 97.1 76.3 
5-NN 96.3 25.4 3.8 96.7 87.5 
EFRID 92.78 88.13 7.41 98.91 50.35 
NB 94.2 25 5.4 79.4 90.4 
Naïve 
Bayesian 
97.68 11.84 8.66 96.65 88.33 
 
From Table 7, it can be seen that satisfactory 
result are obtained. For U2R and R2L classes, the FLS 
finds good results compared to the other methods. FLS 
produces similar results to those of the other methods 
for DOS and Probing classes. However, FLS fails on 
Normal class.  To improve our results we suggest 
introducing walk strategy in the FLS. This point will 
be detailed in future work. 
 
4. Conclusion  
In this paper, we proposed and implemented a 
local search approach based on fuzzy logic for solving 
the problem of intrusion detection. The results showed 
the effectiveness of this classification in the field of 
intrusion detection. We plan to study in future work 
the impact of walk strategy on local search for 
intrusion detection. It would be interesting to apply 
our approach on other types of attacks not existing in 
the DARPA dataset. 
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